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AN OLD MAN'S PROBLEM
A discussion of how a North Dakota resident may be placed
in a mental institution and how the laws concerning civil commit-
ment work presently together with some proposals for improvements.
Old man X, a former junk dealer in a small North Dakota town,
is now a resident in a hospital near Jamestown. If it weren't
for Halloween, he may still have been a small town merchant. It
happened this way:
Every year around Halloween time, some of the young boys
around town get into Mr. X's lot around two or three o'clock in the
morning, and bang on the cars. This wakens Mr. X and because
the boys generally keep on making noise for an hour or so, he rarely
gets any more sleep that night. This year he decided to stop the noise
as soon as it started.
To properly tell the story a little must be known about old
man X. He has resided here almost since the town was founded
and is so old that no one would be surprised to hear he had died. He
neither sees nor hears as well as he used to but still has a very
sharp and keen business mind. He gets more crochety as the years
pass. The last few years he has hardly talked to anyone except
buying customers and a few close acquaintances. For many years,
he has told anyone who was looking at his cars to get off the
property unless they wanted to purchase something, and the last
year or so he has been chasing almost everyone he does not know.
It is apparent Mr. X is not the most popular man in town. He
does not bother anyone off his premises, but neither does he help
make the town a more friendly place in which to live.
This Halloween, Mr. X finally went too far. An old shotgun had
been hanging in the office of Mr. X's building for so long that it was
not expected to ever work again. This year, Mr. X removed the old
shotgun from the wall before Halloween. He then got some ammuni-
tion to fit the gun and removed the shot replacing it with rock salt.
Now when Halloween came, he was ready; he would just take a shot
with the old scatter gun and scare off the intruders. Then maybe
he could get some sleep this year and maybe they would not come
back again the next.
Everything went as Mr. X expected. Late on Halloween night,
the boys came. They started banging on the car roofs, and of
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course Mr. X woke up. This time instead of yelling at the boys to
"get lost," he quietly opened a window of his building and after
finding out where the boys were, he let them have a blast from his
old shotgun. The noise was so loud that the whole building shook,
but the boys left on the run and did not return. Mr. X went back
*to bed and slept better than he had for a long time.
The next night, however, Mr. X did not sleep so well.
One of Mr. X's neighbors, Mr. Y, heard the boys banging on the
cars the night before. Because of the noise, Mr. Y came to the
window and saw the proceedings. He saw Mr. X take a shot at the
boys and without attempting to find out more, called the sheriff and
told him that he, Mr. Y, thought Mr. X should be committed to a
mental hospital.
I. HOW PEOPLE CAN BE COMMITTED IN NORTH DAKOTA
The sheriff told Mr. Y that commitment probably would be best
for Mr. X but that a statement from a doctor indicating that Mr. X
was crazy was needed.' The next morning Mr. Y went to the doctor
in town, told him what he proposed and asked him for a statement.
The doctor agreed that Mr. X's Conduct was outrageous and stated
he would attempt to examine Mr. X to see if he was sick. Needless
to say, Mr. X would not talk to the doctor when contacted. Mr. Y
submitted his application to the County Judge for Mr. X's hospitali-
zation, 2 and the doctor gave the judge a statement that in his
opinion, Mr. X was mentally ill, but had refused to be examined.
The judge then had a notice served on Mr. X telling him to
appear at the doctor's office for an examination that afternoon at one
o'clock.3 Mr. X, who respected the judge, not knowing what to do
or why he had to go to the doctor, did go upon being so ordered. The
doctor, who was the same person who had sent the note to the judge
in the morning, talked to Mr. X for a few minutes and then excused
him. The doctor then sent a note over to the judge saying that in his
1. Under North Dakota emergencyi procedure any police officer could have taken the
old man into custody and applied to any member of the mental health board for permis-
sion to apply to a hospital for emergendy admission. This procedure is available to
"[a]ny health or police officer or licensed physician who has reason to believe that an
Fidividual ts mentally ill, an, alcoholic or a drug addidt and because of his Illness likely
to Injure himself or others...", N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-08 (1970). The procledure as re-
flected in) the text corresponds to the non-etmergency treatment of a person alleged to be
mentally ill, an alcoholic or a drug addict, N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-09-11 (1970). The main
difference, as reflected by the above code sections is in the treatment by the county men-
tal health beard in that, in the emergency procedure the board metnber need only find
there is reason to believe the Individual is ill, whereas in the non-emergency procedure
the board is supposed to find the proposed patient is either ill or unable to make respon-
sible decisions.
2. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11(1) (1970).
3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11(3), (4) (1970).
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opinion Mr. X appeared confused and hostile. The doctor gave his
opinion that Mr. X was in need of some mental care.
4
The judge called the members of the Mental Health Board5 to a
meeting at his chambers at four o'clock that afternoon. The judge
then had notice served on Mr. X telling him that there was to be a
meeting that afternoon at four o'clock concerning Mr. X's sanity
and that he, Mr. X, could come if he wanted to. This notice
was always given by the judge even though he was not required
to do so.6
When four o'clock came everyone was assembled except Mr. X.
He considered the last notice from the judge some form of nonsense
and besides, he did not have any more time to waste that day. Mr. X
felt that there could be no question about his sanity; of course he
was sane. So, the Board discussed Mr. X's mental health without
his presence. 7 By reading the petition and the doctor's report, the
lawyer and the judge readily agreed with the doctor that Mr. X was
certainly ill. The doctor described Mr. X's condition as some form
of schizophrenia, though he was not certain what variety.
The Board agreed that Mr. X would have to be sent to the
Jamestown Mental Hospital. An order was made out for the Public
Health Officer to take Mr. X to Jamestown that evening.8
According to the North Dakota Century Code, Mr. X has been
treated fairly and legally, and no rights of his have been interfered
with in spite of the rapidity of the proceedings.9 Thank goodness,
Mr. X is a hypothetical character.
This is how the North Dakota civil commitment statute can
operate. 0 It does not have to operate so speedily, but it can do so.
Some have called the North Dakota Law very adequate if "intel-
ligently applied."'" There can be no argument with this, but it may
not always be "intelligently applied."
Now let us look at what would happen to Mr. X in another juris-
diction with a different kind of Mental Health law.
II. COMPARISON WITH WASHINGTON, D. C.
In Washington, D. C., Mr. X would have been treated as follows:
4. N.D. CENT. CODE) § 25-03-11(3) (1970). The examining doctor may be the same
person as the doctor on the mental health board.
5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-02-11 (1970). "Each county in this state shall have a county
mental board consisting of: 1. a county judge who shall be chairman of thd board; 2. a
licensed practicing physician; and 3. a licensed practicing attorney."
6. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11(6) (1970).
7. Id.
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11(7) (1970).
9. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11 (1970).
10. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-08, -11 (1970). It should be noted that the North Dakota
civil commitment statute applies equally to alcoholics and drug' addicts under both the
emergency procedure and upon the order of the mental health board.
11. Interview with the Honorable Kirk Smith, Judge of the Grand Forks County Court
of Increased Jurisdiction, in Grand Forks, North Dakota, October 28, 1969 [hereinafter
referred to as Interview].
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To begin with, Mr. Y could not have submitted a petition to the
Mental Health Board. In Washington, D. C., a petition may be filed
by a spouse, parent, legal guardian, physician, health officer, or by
an officer authorized to make arrests. 12 This means that when Mr.
Y called the authorities, he could do nothing except complain about
Mr. X's conduct. The police then could file a petition with the
Mental Health Commission. In the case of Mr. X, the police may
have decided that Mr. X certainly must be some kind of a nut and
therefore belongs in St. Elizabeth's Hospital's rather than a jail.
They would then have to get a physician to examine Mr. X and
submit a statement, or if Mr. X refuses to see a physician, a state-
ment to this effect must be submitted.
14
After the petition is filed with the Mental Health Commission,
a copy of the petition must be sent to Mr. X.15 The Commission
shall promptly examine Mr. X and hold a hearing on the issue of his
mental illness. The hearing, like North Dakota's, is an informal one
in which all relevant evidence is to be heard.1 6 One of the differences
between Washington, D. C. and North Dakota is pointed out at this
juncture, however. In the District of Columbia Mr. X must be repre-
sented by counsel, while in North Dakota he does not have to be."
In Mr. X's case, counsel could point out to the Commission that
Mr. X's act was at most an assault, but may not even be that
because the boys were trespassers.18 The city may have an ordinance
against discharging firearms within the city limits. 9 Counsel could
inform the Commission of the aggravation Mr. X has suffered over
the years as a result of the Halloween night pranks, and that this
had caused him to prepare a means to stop the juvenile's tricks.
Presenting evidence of Mr. X's actions before Halloween night would
tend to show that he was an elderly person who merely wanted
to be left alone. The attorney can also bring in witnesses who know
Mr. X to testify as to his mental health, if he so desired.2 0 Without
an attorney it is doubtful that these steps could be taken, especially
when the proposed patient does not attend the hearing.
In Washington, D. C., the Commission holds a hearing on Mr.
X's mental health, and if they determine that he is mentally ill
12. D.C4 CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 21-541(a) (1967).
13. St. Elizabeth's Hospital is the public Mental Health Hospital for the District of
Columbia.
14. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 21-541(a) (1967).
15. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 21-541(b) (1967).
16. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11(6) (1970) wvith D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN.
21-541(b) (1967).
17. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-093-11(6) (1970). D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 21-543 (1967).
18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-26-01, -03 (1960). State v. Cruikshank, 13 N.D. 337, 100 N.W.
697 (1904).
19. Grand Forks City Code §'12-0502 (1969). The discharge of a firearm is unlawful
except as a defense to an attack on the person or his property.
20. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 21-542(a) (1967). Also permitted In North Dakota, see
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11(6) (19701).
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and because of the illness is likely to injure himself or others, they
will report this to the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia.2 1 If the Commission finds that Mr. X is not likely
to harm himself or others, they shall immediately order Mr. X's
release. 2 2 This is contrasted with North Dakota where the District
Court never hears of the commitment process, and the Mental Health
Board is the sole decision making body.2 3
If the Commission finds Mr. X is likely to injure someone, he will
have a hearing before the District Court. At this time he may have
a jury trial concerning his mental status, if he desires, 24 and he must
have an attorney which is furnished by the government, if neces-
sary.25 Again, Mr. X must be found likely to injure himself or
others before he may be committed to a mental hospital . 2  The
government has the burden of showing this by a preponderance of
the evidence, and may also have to show that Mr. X will receive
treatment if committed.2 7 However, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure do not apply to mental health hearings in Federal Court
in Washington, D. C.
25
To summarize the different treatment offered Mr. X in commit-
ment proceedings, Washington, D. C. demands that the proposed
patient be represented by an attorney in all proceedings, 2 whereas
North Dakota offers to provide an attorney for the patient, but does
not make it mandatbry.30 In Washington, D. C. the proposed patient
must be found to be likely to injure himself or others because of the
illness; 3 1 not so in North Dakota.3 2 In the District of Columbia the
court may order hospitalization for an indeterminate period, or order
other treatment which is believed to be in the best interests of the
patient or the public.3 3 In North Dakota the only authorized pro-
cedure is to order hospitalization3 4 which apparently will be for
an indefinite period, as the statutes state the patient shall be dis-
charged when the ". . . conditions justifying hospitalization no longer
exist. . . ...5 Both North Dakota and Washington, D. C. have pro-
21. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 21-544 (1967).
22. Id.
23. N.D. CENT. CODE §, 25-03-11 (1970).
24. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 21-545(a) (1967).
25. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 21-543 (1967).
26. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
27. In re Alexander, 372 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
28. FED. R. Crv. P. 81(a)(1).
29. D.C. CODE ENCYcL. ANN. § 21-543 (1967).
30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11(6) (1970).
31. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 21-545(b) (1967).
32. N.D. CENT.) CODE § 25-03-11(7) (1970').
33. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 21-545(b) (1967).
34. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11(7) (1970). The county mental health board could pos-
sibly coerce the proposed patient to obtain other treatment, e. g. Area Mental Health Cen-
ter, bV telling the proposed patient that he or she will be committed if the suggestion is
not followed.
35. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-15 (1970).
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visions for emergency commitment of persons who are likely to
injure himself or others,386 but that is a different subject open to
attack in both jurisdictions. 7
What is this power that can take a person out of society against
his will and how does it operate?
III. STATE POWER OVER INDIVIDUALS
There are several sources of authority over a person by the
state. One is the state police power to preserve the peace of
the community. 8 Another is the parens patriae power to protect
the proprietary and personal interest of the citizens.3 9 Throughout
these sources of authority the concept of a person's due process




The concept of due process is traced to the highest authority
in our land, the United States Constitution.4 1 The question as to
what constitues due process, however, seems to be a never ending
one and new ground is being traversed even now.'
2
A. History
The idea of having safeguards for commitment proceedings
arose in the 1800's partly as a result of a crusade by a Mrs. Packard,
an ex mental patient. She campaigned during the 1860's in an attempt
to arouse public concern in order to prevent railroading persons to
hospitals. Her activities resulted in the establishment of some due
process requirements drawn from incompetency proceedings and
criminal law practice. Her campaign consisted of exposing various
methods used to put persons in asylums without any consideration for
the person involved.43
B. Conflict Between Lawyers and Psychiatrists
There would possibly be very little argument about whether or
not there should be due process and how protecting it should be
handled in commitment proceedings if it were not for psychiatrists.
The psychiatrist feels he should be responsible for the admittance
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-08 (1970); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 21-521 (1967).
37. See L. Kaplan, Civil Commitment "As You Ike It", 49 B.U. I. REv. 14, 40 (1969).
38. State v. Cromwell, 72 N.D. 565, 9 N.W.2d 914, 919 (1943).
39. Kitchens v. Steele, 112 F. Supp. 383 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
40 E. g., Higgins v. United' States, 205 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
650 (1953).
41. U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV. No person shall be deprived of ... life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; . . ."
42. E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
43. Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C. L. REv. 274, 276 (1952).
348
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and discharge of patients as this is a health problem, whereas the
lawyer feels that this is a function of the court because it involves
the loss of liberty and rights.4 Both of these forces are essential par-
ties to a commitment proceeding. Therefore, there has to be a meet-
ing ground between these two ideas.
There are some authorities that would do away with the judicial
type hearing entirely. They would substitute the medical specialists
to be the sole judge of whether or not a person should be committed
to a hospital.4 5 However, it should be pointed out that people have
been declared mentally ill by the medical profession who were mere-
ly unable to speak English. In a 1960 Chicago incident, a Polish
emigrant and his wife were committed and judged insane even
though they could not speak English, and were detained in a men-
tal hospital until the husband hung himself. The resulting publicity
pointed out the injustice and the wife was released the next day.46
If the statutory due process requirements had been followed there,
it is quite likely that Mr. Duzynski would be alive and free rather
than committed without a hearing. This particular case arose as a
result of a discrepancy between the statutory procedure and the practi-
cal methods used. Illinois, at that time, did have procedural safe
guards that should have prevented the above tragedy.
47
The Illinois Mental Health Code, like North Dakota, provides for
a hearing before commitment 8 and the Illinois statute calls for
a court hearing with a jury trial as a matter of right, upon request . 4
Even the Illinois Emergency Admission procedure requires a cer-
ticifation of a physician to accompany the petition.5 0 Thus it is hard
to see how the Duzynskis could have been "railroaded," as they
evidently were. The only answer appears to be that the doctor's
concern for the mental health overrode his concern for following
the law, 51 but the doctor did not do his job properly in this case.
C. What is Mental Illness?
The question is; how can meaningful due process safeguards be
enacted for an individual's protection and yet allow the medical
profession to adequately care for a person's mental illness?
44. Tao, Civ'U Commitment of the Mentally In in the District of Columbia, 13 How. L.
J. 303 (1967).
45. N. Kittrie, Compulory Mental Treatment and the Requirements of "Due Process",
21 OHIO ST. L. J. 28, 46 (1960) describes the English Mental Health Bill.
46. Chicago Daily News, Marchl 29, 1962, at 10, col. 1.
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91% (1966, Supp. 1969). The present Illinois Mental Health
Code was adopted in 1951.
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91% § 8-3, -4 (Supp. 1969).
49. Id. at § 9-2 (Supp. 1969).
50. Id. at § 7-1 (Supp. 1969).
51. But see Bowman, President's Address, 103 AM. J4 PSYCHIATRY 1, 12 (1946) for a
statement of how legal problems have caused the same result of a patient committing
suicide.
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This gives rise to another question; what is "mental illness" and
what degree of illness must be present before a person must be
committed?
It is possible that both questions will never be answered satis-
factorily with the present knowledge of psychiatry. It seems as if
psychiatrists can call almost any one "mentally ill" with the elastic
concepts incorporated in their diagnostic manual. 52 Using the psy-
chiatric criteria of what is mentally ill would seem to put many
people in a hospital situation that would never belong there, ac-
cording to a layman. For example, a law school professor who has
performed brilliantly is suffering from involutional depression and
there is some chance he may commit suicide. It is thought he
could be helped by treatment but he refuses to see a doctor. He has
expressed a hope years ago that he would never be forced to a
mental hospital unless he becomes dangerous. It is doubtful that
non-psychiatrists would wish this man to be committed, even
though he possibly could be helped.
53
The law requires the proposed patient be sick to a certain degree
before commitment is warranted. This is where the state statutes
vary immensely. Massachusetts makes social nonconformity
grounds for commitment. 54 Washington, D. C. on the other hand,
must find the patient likely to injure himself or others because of
the illness before commitment or treatment may be ordered.
55
North Dakota falls in between this by requiring that the proposed
patient either be likely to cause injury if left free, or be too ill to
be able to make responsible decisions. 56 Which statute is the cor-
rect one depends on the reader's point of view, or maybe whether
the reader is a psychiatrist or lawyer.
The psychiatrists argue that to wait until a person becomes dan-
gerous before commitment or treatment can be ordered is to im-
properly delay needed treatment. They also urge that it is society's
duty to provide this treatment because of the person's inability to
recognize his need for it.57 Lawyers may point out that psychiatry is
a very inexact science and the judge of whom should receive forced
mental treatment is best left to non-psychiatrists. 58 The lawyers
concern themselves with due process of law as being essential to
52. ALLEN, FESSTER & RuBIN, READINGS ix LAW AND PsYcHiATRy 49-56 (1968). This
article contains a reprint of the diagnostic manual.
53. J. Livermaor, C. Malmquist & P. Meehl, On the Justifioation8 for Civil Commit-
ment, 117 U. PA. L. R. 75, 94 (1968).
54. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 1 (1969).
55. D.C. CODE ENCYcL. ANN. § 21-545(b) (1967).
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11(7) (Supp. 1969).
57. Kittrie, 8upra note 45, at 36.




be satisfied, before the taking of a person's freedom can be war-
ranted.5 9
An attempt to balance the interests of both the psychiatrists
and the lawyers is the only way that a satisfactory compromise
will ever be reached. North Dakota has attempted to do this in
several ways. First by having the medical profession assist in the
construction of the statute,60 which was first enacted in 1967.61 Sec-
ond, the statute permits emergency commitment in the event a
person is considered likely to injure himself or others. Then the
mental hospital shall immediately examine the person to determine
if hospitalization is warranted. 62 The patient shall be released within
five days, upon his request, unless the hospital superintendent or
county judge delays the release for twenty days to allow for the
mental health board to review the case.6 3 But this statute does not
insure that a person's constitutional rights will be observed. Thus
the legal profession, as the officers of the court, must take an active
part in protecting due process requirements and tempering the strict
medical requirements.
D. Requirements of Due Process
The due process involved requires that a person is entitled to
a fair hearing, on notice, should he be threatened with commit-
ment. This requirement has been constant for many years in Ameri-
can courts. 64 Since the Gault decision however, there has been in-
creasing discussion of what does constitute due process in mental
commitment hearings.65
Older cases on the subject of due process in a mental commit-
ment proceeding held that as long as notice was given and the
defendant had an opportunity to defend, due process was satisfied. 66
It did not matter that the proposed patient made no attempt to de-
fend against the charge.6 7 There was no issue raised about a
lawyer, as the court appointed a guardian ad litem who entered
a plea denying the alleged insanity putting the petitioners to their
proof of insanity. Due process has been held to impose limitations
on all branches of government but that when life and liberty are in
question there must be judicial proceedings.6 8 However, the courts
59. See Comment, The Expanding Role of the Lavyer and the Court in Securing Psy-
chiatric Treatment for Patients Confined Pursuant to Civil Commitment Procedures, 6
HOUSTON I. REV. 519 (1969).
60. Interview, supra note 11.
61. Ch. 196, § 3 [1957] N.D. Sess. Laws 368, 374.
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-08 (1970).
°63. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-10 (1970).
64. Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 437 (1901).
65. Comment, aupra note 57.
66. Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436 (1901).
67. Id.
68. T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 244 (1890).
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have held that due process does not always require a judicial hear-
ing,6 9 thus ground was broken for the mental health board that
exists in North Dakota.
The idea of what constitutes due process has been held to be
that the defendant must be given notice in order to be able to present
his case. 70 Later it was given the requirement that it is a funda-
mental fairness doctrine 7 1 and as a concept, more fluid than the
other provisions of the Bill of Rights. 72 The concept of the due
process clause being a more fluid clause than others may be at-
tacked as allowing different standards of proof to be required for
taking a person's liberty, depending on the charge against a per-
son. It does, however, allow for the updating of procedures to
meet current ideas on due process without the necessity of legisla-
tion. This means that the court can more validly "legislate" in this
area.
The natural result of "legislation" in this area would seem to
be a stricter standard of due process requirements in the area
of civil commitments. This would be a natural follow-up of cases
like In re Gault73 holding that a person must be advised of his right
to be represented by counsel. It seems logical that if notice is re-
quired that a person is entitled to an attorney in a juvenile court
hearing, the same requirement should be present in mental health
proceedings.7 4 Confinement is confinement regardless of what it is
called. The basic issue is the same in the Gault case as in a mental
health hearing: the potential loss of an individual's freedom to
circulate in society.
V. ATTORNEY'S ROLE AT HEARING
Making certain that everyone knows they are entitled to an at-
torney is only part of the problem however. The attorney must
know what he is to do in a mental health hearing. At present there
are very few statutory duties for an attorney in a hearing.75 In
fact there is documentation as to confusion on the attorney's part
as to who is the client, the county who pays the bill, or the patient.7 6
There are suggestions that the attorney should have a role created
69. United States v. Ju Toy, 198' U.S. 253 (1905).
70. Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427 (1901).
71. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 649 (1948).
72. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
73. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
74. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968). This case stated that coun-
sel must be provided in a mental health hearing unless knowingly waived.
75. Cohen, The Punction of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ii, 44
Tax L. REv. 424 (1965-66).
76. Id. at 447.
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by statute.7 This hardly seems necessary for an inquiring attorney,
however.
In North Dakota there would seem to be many areas in which
an attorney could raise issues before the mental health board. In
a petition for hospitalization under order of the mental health board,
the attorney can attempt to determine if the forms have been
properly completed and whether or not they were completed by per-
sons authorized to do so. 7 8 One area it would seem that an attorney
should give special attention to is the competency of the examining
physician and the completeness of the exam. It would hardly seem
possible that a doctor could examine an average person for only
a few minutes and yet make a reasonable conclusion as to that per-
son's mental health. Yet this is being done in practice.7 9 The presen-
tation of witnesses would probably only be done by an attorney and
the questioning of witnesses by an attorney would seem to be pre-
ferable to that of a layman in bringing out the relevant evidence at
a hearing.
The main objective is to prevent assembly line commitment.
The prevention of "automatic" commitment would seem to be best
provided by having a board hearing, such as in North Dakota, with
the burden of proof on the shoulders of the party making the com-
plaint.A0 In this type of procedure the testimony of the psychiatrist
could be put to the test of adverse questioning and the proposed
patient is assumed normal unless shown to be otherwise. Com-
bined with a mandatory attorney for the defendant and a commit-
ment order from the board being necessary before any involuntary
patient could be admitted to a mental hospital, would seem to re-
duce the possibility of "railroading."
We have seen that a form of "railroading" is possible under
North Dakota law. How then, could specific provisions be incor-
porated into the North Dakota statutes preventing this, yet allowing
enough flexibility to suit local conditions?
VI. POSSIBLE REFORMS
Some suggested reforms are: do away with indefinite commit-
ments; require an attorney for every proposed patient; set up audits
on the various agencies to see that they do their job properly;
require that a physician or psychiatrist present oral testimony at
a commitment hearing; enact a provision expressly authorizing the
77. Id. at 457.
78. N.D. CnNT. Conn § 25-03-11(1) (1970).
79. Wille, The Mental Health Cltnio-Expressway to Asylum, Chicago Daily News,
Mar. 26, 1962, at 10, col. 4.
80. In re Alexander, 372 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The Washington D.C. procedure
seems Just.
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board to order outpatient treatment at a clinic or hospital; give
the board the power of arrest in order to facilitate the calling of
proposed patients and witnesses to the board hearing; 81 consolidate
boards in lesser populated areas. 82 These suggestions will be briefly
dealt with in the following paragraphs.
Indefinite commitments have the possibility of sentencing some-
one to a mental health hospital for life. Even though someone may
be properly committed, he may conceivably improve to a point where
he may be able to care for himself but not be completely cured.
Creating a commitment procedure whereby a person is committed
for a predetermined period, would reduce the possibility of a life-
time confinement. The procedure could be set up so that a person's
confinement is continued for more than one year only if it can be
justified to the satisfaction of the committing board. The procedure
could call for a detailed report by the psychiatrist, calling the
board's attention to the reasons why hospitalization is needed for
more than whatever the commitment period is.
Requiring an attorney for each proposed patient would help
prevent abuses of a patient's due process rights and privileges. The
procedure followed by the attorney however, will have to be much
more thorough than the procedure followed in some areas where
attorneys are appointed.82 Inducing adequate attorney representa-
tion would seem to be best assured by paying each attorney for the
actual time spent on a case and requiring an appearance by the
attorney before the board in the proposed patient's behalf. It
would, however, seem proper that a person could waive an attorney
if the board is satisfied that the person does it knowingly.
Setting up audits or checks on the commitment of persons may
be the best method to issue fair treatment to all patients. New York
has an interesting service that may be used as an example. A
mental health information service is a part of each division of the
New York Supreme Court.8 4 The service is charged with the fol-
lowing duties: study and review admission and retention of all in-
voluntary adult patients and all minor patients; 8 5 inform patients of
their rights to legal counsel and other procedural information;s8  pro-
vide the court with the necessary information about each proposed
patient; 87 provide similar services for voluntary patients upon re-
quests; 8 assist the families and patients as ordered by the court.8 9
81. Interview, supra note 11.
82. Id.
83. See, Cohen, 8upra note 75.
84. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw § 88 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
85. Id. § 88(a).
86. I& § 88(b).
87. Id. § 88(c).
88. Id. § 88(d).
89. Id. § 88(e).
NOTES
North Dakota could duplicate this service to the extent of
providing counsel to visit each recently committed patient to dis-
cuss the legal rights of the patient.
Requiring a doctor to testify at a commitment hearing would
allow the board to question the doctor as to methods used to de-
termine mental health, and whether or not they were adequately
used in the case being heard. Because of documented evidence of
very summary examinations," this would seem to be a very necessary
requirement of any hearing where a person's freedom is at stake.
If an attorney were required for the proposed patient there would
seem to be less need for the board to closely scrutinize the ex-
amining doctor's report, as this should be the attorney's role.
With the advent of tranquilizing drugs, the amount of hospital-
ization needed has been drastically reduced. The use of these drugs
also should allow many to be treated on an outpatient basis rather
than in a hospital setting only. Yet the North Dakota Century Code
has no provision for this. It is possible to coerce someone into visit-
ing a psychiatrist by threatening them with commitment if they
do not do so. It would seem preferable that statutory recognition
of the work of organizations such as the Area Mental Health Centers
should be enacted.
It has been suggested that the mental health board be given
the power of arrest in order to facilitate it's proceedings. 91 This
could be used to assure that the subject of the hearing would be
present at the commitment hearing. However, the use of these
powers would require that the law enforcement agencies be involved
when a witness or proposed patient does not want to appear. The
use of an arresting power seems directly contrary to the provisions
of the North Dakota law which provides that police vehicles are
not to be used for patient transportation, 92 nor are patients to be
placed in jails awaiting a hearing or commitment.
9 3
The Mental Health Board presently has the power to issue and
enforce subpoenas, 94 which would seem to give it adequate power
to order anyone subject to the Board's authority to attend a hear-
ing. Issuing an arrest warrant may expedite matters somewhat,
but possibly expediting too much may contribute to "railroading."
Much better would seem to be the idea of consolidating the
mental health boards in counties of small population.9 5 Perhaps
legislation could be introduced permitting counties to undertake this
90. See footnote 79.
91. Interview, supra note 11.
92. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-13(1) (1970).
93. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-13(2) (1970).
94. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-02-16 (1970).
95. Interview, supra note 11.
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voluntarily and have the chairmanship of the board rotate between
the counties. 96 By doing this it is possible that more expert doc-
tors may become available in counties where there are no psychia-
trists available. Also, the board should gain more expertise by hear-
ing more cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
North Dakota does have a workable mental health law at present.
It is going to be hard to demand some of the refinements in a
state with the small population North Dakota has versus that which
can be found in larger states9 7 Therefore, a "make do" attitude
must be adopted to some extent. This is no excuse, however, to al-
low for the possibility of ignoring a person's constitutional rights,
when the legal profession is well represented in North Dakota. 98 As
a result of the foregoing discussion, it would seem that the easiest
and most beneficial changes that North Dakota could make in its
present law would be to provide for a lawyer to visit each patient
who is committed to inform them of their rights, require the examin-
ing doctor to personally testify before the committing board, change
the indefinite commitment to a commitment for a determined period,
require reports from the hospital to the committing board, to con-
solidate some of the present boards in counties with low popula
tions, and to require an attorney be present to represent each pro-
posed patient before the mental health board.
DALE EVAVOLD
96. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-02-11 (1970). The County Judge is the Chairman i4nder
present law.
97. It is a well recognized fact that it is hard to attract members of the medical pro-
fession to rural areas.
98. U.S. ]BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 152
(90th ed. 1969). The table on this page shows that there is one attorney for every 872
people in the state of North Dakota.
